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INTRODUCTION

It is widely believed that some judicial cases should qualify as
superprecedents.1 This Article considers the idea of a judicial superprecedent2 at
the level of broad legal theory,3 as well as at the level of the particular
superprecedent cases themselves.4 As it turns out, the apparently reasonably clear
idea of a superprecedent is actually remarkably unclear in a variety of often
conflicting ways.5 Beyond the definitional conflicts, however, lie what we might

*
Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of
Law.
1

For the range of proposed theories of a judicial superprecedent, and some commonly
proposed superprecedent cases, see infra Part II. Whether there are, along with possible
superprecedents and ordinary precedents, what we might call “infraprecedents,” or distinctively
weak precedents, is a separate issue.
2
3

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.

4

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II. Merely for one initial example, consider whether a case that has largely
withstood many challenges from many quarters over time, as perhaps in the case of Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), can qualify as a superprecedent. Or must the case have not been subject to
recent serious challenges at any level, as perhaps in the case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S.
5
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call the paradoxes of superprecedence, with these paradoxes themselves taking
various forms.6 These paradoxes of superprecedence take our understanding of
the idea of a precedent in surprising directions. And then in turn, beyond these
paradoxes of superprecedence, are a range of unresolved important problems
plaguing the very idea of a judicial superprecedent.
The latter problems begin, first, with the familiar understanding of a
superprecedent as somehow a “foundational” or “bedrock” case. This metaphor
may seem apt and even uncontroversial. But as it turns out, the metaphor of a
suprecedent’s foundational or bedrock status is as importantly misleading as it is
otherwise helpful.7 And then secondly, there is the crucial problem of whether
the idea of a superprecedent is, or should be, primarily descriptive; is instead
already primarily normative or evaluative in character; or else is some interesting
hybrid of both of these distinct approaches.8 Third, and finally, there is the
problem of the sheer range and variety of the possible critical responses to any
current judicial superprecedent.9 What sorts of judicial or legislative treatments
of a case are compatible with that case’s retaining its superprecedent status? This
is a further important question that has been left widely under-discussed.
Ultimately, this Article concludes10 that unless the paradoxes and then
the fundamental unresolved problems referred to above are satisfactorily
addressed, we should subordinate, if not dismiss, the idea of a judicial
superprecedent as we seek to understand and normatively steer the case
adjudication process.
II. WHAT IS, OR SHOULD BE, A JUDICIAL SUPERPRECEDENT?
The idea of a judicial precedent in general, whether super or not, and
whatever its complications, is a familiar one.11 Whatever one’s preferred

304 (1816), on the Supreme Court’s ultimate authority over state courts in matters of federal law.
Or perhaps a case might qualify as a superprecedent, in part, on either of the above theories.
6
See infra Part III, discussing paradoxes of the sheer logical impossibility of overruling certain doctrines; paradoxes of the inevitable reassertion of a case principle in the face of any overruling; paradoxes of otherwise clearly iconic superprecedents with chronically disappointing effects; and paradoxes of apparent superprecedents whose core holdings were arguably unnecessary
and, in practice, do little jurisprudential work.
7
8
9
10

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.

11

See generally BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT (2016); RANDY
J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017); Anthony T. Kronman,
Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C.
L. REV. 367 (1988); J. L. Montrose, Distinguishing Cases and the Limits of Ratio Decidendi, 19
MOD. L. REV. 525, 526 (1956) (“[I]t is inadequate to point to distinctions between cases without
referring to the principles which make those distinctions significant.”); Frederick Schauer,
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interpretive judicial method,12 the question of a role for case precedent in general
inevitably arises. We must at some point ask the broad questions posed by
Professor Frederick Schauer: “When precedent matters, just how much should it
matter? If we are to be shackled to the past and beholden to the future, just how
tight are those bonds, and what should it take to loose [sic] them?”13
A familiar part of many attempts to answer just such general questions
invokes the idea of a judicial superprecedent. The term “superprecedent” was
used more than 40 years ago by Professors William Landes and Richard Posner.14
Landes and Posner invoked the idea of a case that is “so effective in defining the
requirements of the law that it prevents legal disputes from arising in the first
place.”15
The term “super–stare decisis,” used in a related sense, was later adopted
by then–Fourth Circuit Judge Michael Luttig.16 Judge Luttig interpreted the
Court’s plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey17 as an attempt to definitively resolve basic controversies set in motion
by Roe v. Wade,18 securing thereby “a woman’s fundamental right to choose
whether or not to proceed with a pregnancy.”19 Judge Luttig thus understood the
Casey plurality opinion as consciously seeking superprecedent status for Roe, if
not also for itself.20
The idea of a judicial superprecedent has gained wider public exposure
through debates over the status of Roe and Casey in the context of Supreme Court
nominations.21 Roe’s status as a possible judicial superprecedent has been the

Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A
Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2012).
12
For example, this includes mainstream forms of originalism. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett,
It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 1232, 1232–37 (2006); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009). For a shorter discussion, see John O. McGinnis,
How Originalism Integrates Precedent, Part I, LAW & LIBERTY (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.lawliberty.org/2018/09/18/how-originalism-integrates-precedent-part-i/.
13

Schauer, supra note 11, at 571.
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976).
15
Id. at 251.
14

16
See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376, 376–77 (4th Cir. 2000)
(Luttig, J.).
17
18
19
20

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Richmond Med. Ctr., 219 F.3d at 376.
See id. at 376–77.

21

See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Committee on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5–9 (2017) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member, S.
Comm.
on
the
Judiciary),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7

148

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122

subject of high-profile discussion.22 For the moment, though, we can say merely
that Roe clearly illustrates the need for reflection on what should, or does, make
a particular judicial case into a superprecedent. This broader, multi-dimensional
question is pursued herein at some length.23
An initial concern is what to make of the fact that Roe has withstood
numerous judicial challenges, as well as attempted statutory limitations, and
continuing public critique and debate.24 Some theory is needed if we are to take
these circumstances into proper account in determining the nature and
application of superprecedent status. If an important case has been, and continues
to be, repeatedly but unsuccessfully challenged, should that count in favor of
superprecedent status? Against superprecedent status? Could there be more than
one kind of “superprecedent”? Matters of definition, in this context, seem crucial.
Commentators have variously accorded and denied superprecedent
status to a number of well-known judicial cases. Lists and individual examples
of presumed superprecedents, on one definition or another, have been provided
by writers with diverse interpretive methodologies and political perspectives.
Thus, we have non-exhaustive lists from Judge Amy Coney Barrett25 and from
Professors Michael Gerhardt,26 Mark Kende,27 and Michael Sinclair,28 among
others, with a number of particular cases making multiple appearances.

115shrg28638/pdf/CHRG-115shrg28638.pdf; Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John
G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2–4 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CHRG-ROBERTS/pdf/GPO-CHRGROBERTS.pdf; see also Orrin G. Hatch, There’s Nothing “Super” About Roe v. Wade, 29 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1 (Mar. 12, 2018). For journalistic coverage, see Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do
You Believe in “Superprecedent?”, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/so-do-you-believe-in-superprecedent.html/. For a judicial
reference to the purported status of Roe as a superprecedent in the context of Supreme Court
confirmation proceedings, see Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Indiana State Department of Health, 888 F.3d 300, 310, 311–12 (7th Cir. 2018) (Manion, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (“Of course, there’s no such thing as
“super-precedent”—any case may be overruled by five Supreme Court Justices.”).
22
See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
23
24

See infra Parts II–IV.
See infra note 135.

25

See Amy C. Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711,
1734–35 (2013); see also Amy Coney Barrett & John Copeland Nagle, Congressional Originalism,
19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 13–14 (2016).
26
See Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1208–17 (2006)
[hereinafter Gerhardt, Super Precedent].
27
See Mark S. Kende, Is Bakke Now a Super-Precedent and Does It Matter? The U.S.
Supreme Court’s Updated Constitutional Approach to Affirmative Action, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L.:
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 15, 17 (2013).
28
See Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 363–64
(2007).
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Judge Barrett, for example, cites29 the consensually backed30 cases of
Marbury v. Madison,31 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,32 Helvering v. Davis,33 the
Legal Tender Cases,34 Mapp v. Ohio,35 Brown v. Board of Education,36 and the
Civil Rights Cases.37 Professor Gerhardt cites38 Marbury, perhaps Duncan v.
Louisiana,39 Baker v. Carr,40 the Legal Tender Cases,41 the Civil Rights Cases,
Washington v. Davis,42 and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.43 In his
turn, Professor Kende refers to the Justice Lewis Powell opinion in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,44 Marbury, Brown, the Jackson opinion in
Youngstown, and Griswold v. Connecticut.45 Finally, Michael Sinclair discusses

29

See Barrett, supra note 25.

30

See id. at 1734.
5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review of congressional statutes).

31

32
14 U.S. 304 (1816) (validating Supreme Court review of federal question determinations by
state courts).
33

301 U.S. 619 (1937) (constitutionally validating the Social Security Act).
79 U.S. 457 (1870) (constitutionally validating the Treasury’s issuance of paper money as
legal tender).
35
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause).
36
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting purportedly separate-but-equal public-school racial segregation).
37
109 U.S. 3 (1883) (requiring a showing of state, as distinct from mere private party, action
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
38
See Gerhardt, supra note 26.
34

39
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (providing a rationale for the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation
doctrine).
40

369 U.S. 186 (1962) (defining the scope and limits of the political question doctrine
regarding equal-protection challenges to state legislative apportionment).
41

79 U.S. 457 (1870).
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (delimiting the roles of strict and minimum scrutiny in racial equal
protection context).
43
343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (presenting an analytical framework for
delineating the scope of presidential executive authority).
44
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (emphasizing educational diversity goals as tested by a strict scrutiny
standard).
45
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (narrowly rejecting a state statute limiting the use of contraceptives by
married couples and more broadly invigorating privacy or autonomy-oriented substantive due
process).
42
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Roe v. Wade46 but considers Marbury and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins47 to be
clearer instances of superprecedents.48
These cases do not exhaust the roster of arguable superprecedents. Other
cases certainly might be added.49 All such superprecedent candidates contribute
something both toward formulating one or more definitions of a superprecedent
as well as toward other ways of usefully characterizing superprecedents. As it
turns out, a number of proposed alternative characterizations are currently
available. The proposed alternative characterizations vary in their focus and
stringency, but there are certainly some recurring themes among the possible
understandings of a judicial superprecedent.
Perhaps the most widely discussed account of the idea of a judicial
superprecedent is that offered by Professor Michael Gerhardt.50 Professor
Gerhardt’s most concise formulation of the idea of a superprecedent refers
simply to “prior case law which is practically immune to reconsideration.”51 He
then adds that the immunity from reconsideration must reflect the

46

410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a substantive due process abortion right with regulations
subject to strict scrutiny).
47

304 U.S. 64 (1938) (disempowering federal courts from establishing a general federal law
when sitting in diversity jurisdiction).
48

See Sinclair, supra note 28, at 364–65.
See, e.g., Allison R. Hayward, The Per Curiam Opinion of Steel: Buckley v. Valeo as Superprecedent?: Clues from Wisconsin and Vermont, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 195, 202 (2006);
Russell A. Hilton, Comment, The Case for the Selective Disincorporation of the Establishment
Clause: Is Everson a Super-Precedent?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1701, 1742 (2007) (“Descriptively speaking, . . . Everson’s incorporation of the Establishment Clause [as binding the states] likely qualifies
as a super-precedent,” in the sense that, whatever its cogency in other respects, “Everson’s status
will likely prevent the Court from overruling it.”). Hayward cites, along with Marbury and the
Legal Tender Cases, the separation of powers case of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295
U.S. 602 (1935), which upheld certain statutory limitations on the President’s power to remove
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial officials. Hayward, supra. The significance of Humphrey’s Executor seems, however, to be called into question by the broader test adopted in Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 686–91 (1988).
50
See Gerhardt, Super Precedent, supra note 26; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1279 (2008) [hereinafter Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of
Precedent]. Among the many discussions of Professor Gerhardt’s approach, see, for example,
GARNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 235; Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 37, 50 (2008); Liaquat Ali Khan, Temporality of Law, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 55, 85 (2009);
Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1062–64 (2013); William
P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1272–73 (2011). It is also certainly possible to be generally skeptical of the idea of a judicial superprecedent. See, e.g., Ilya
Somin, Why “Settled Law” Isn’t Really Settled—and Why That’s Often a Good Thing, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 9, 2018, 3:57 PM), https://reason.com/2018/09/09/why-settled-law-isnt-reallysettled-and/.
51
Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Precedent, supra note 50, at 1292.
49
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“well-settled”52 status of the case in question.53 At least a necessary condition for
superprecedent status, Professor Gerhardt continues, is that the case “has been
widely and uniformly accepted by public authorities generally, including the
Court, the President, and Congress.”54 The “precedents which are the least likely
to be reopened because of the practical impossibility of finding compelling
reasons to reopen them are, effectively, superprecedents.”55
A bit more elaborately, Professor Gerhardt then argues that
superprecedents are those constitutional decisions in which public institutions
have heavily invested,56 have repeatedly relied upon, and have consistently
supported over a significant period of time. Superprecedents thus seep into the
public consciousness57 and become fixtures of the legal framework.
Superprecedents are the clearest instances in which “the institutional values
promoted by fidelity to precedent—consistency, stability, predictability, and
social reliance—have become irredeemably compelling.”58
Crucially, Professor Gerhardt consistently refers to superprecedents as
“foundational” with regard to legal practices, or foundational with regard to
doctrine, or foundational with regard to other decisions.59 The foundationalist

52
53

Id. at 1293.
See id.

54

Id.
Id. at 1295. The mere practical unlikeliness of a case being reopened, however, tells us little
about superprecedent status. A broadly cited case might be secure because its very openness, if not
near emptiness, is compatible with a range of case outcomes, generally, or in any given case. See,
for example, the general balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
56
There may also be precedents that are especially unlikely to be reopened, and which no one
wants to reopen, but only because those precedents have no contemporary relevance, and have
receded in history’s wake. Such cases, as now practical irrelevancies, are not superprecedents, but
close to the opposite. And some cases may be practically irreversible merely because of the distribution of political power, rather than from a consensus as to the merit or authority of the case
decision.
57
It seems doubtful, however, that otherwise uncontroversial candidates for superprecedent
status must have seeped into the public consciousness as case authorities. Merely for example, the
public, at least for the present, consciously thinks of paper money as legal tender. But the public
typically has no thought, conscious or otherwise, of the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870).
In particular, Professor Gerhardt discusses the Legal Tender Cases in Gerhardt, Super Precedent,
supra note 50, at 1213–14. Consider also the possible disappearance of paper money, as discussed
in Nicolas Colas, Reports of Cash’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2017,
5:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-08-28/reports-of-cash-s-death-aregreatly-exaggerated; Rose Eveleth, The Truth About the Death of Cash, BBC (July 24, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150724-the-truth-about-the-death-of-cash; Nathanial Popper
et al., Will Cash Disappear?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/14/business/dealbook/cashless-economy.html.
58
Gerhardt, Super Precedent, supra note 26, at 1206.
55

59
The characterization of superprecedents as thus foundational recurs throughout Gerhardt.
Id. For important problems with the “foundation” metaphor, see infra Part IV.
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metaphor has been, importantly, taken up in this context by others.60 As we shall
see, however, the foundationalist metaphor, even if otherwise illuminating, is
also crucially misleading.61
Other writers and judges have offered a range of alternative
understandings of the idea of a superprecedent. Consider, for example, the
approach advocated by now-Seventh Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett and by
her colleague Professor John Nagle.62 Judge Barrett suggests that
“[s]uperprecedents are cases that no justice would overrule, even if she disagrees
with the interpretive premises from which the precedent proceeds.”63
A case’s exceptional unlikelihood of being overruled may, however, be
due to considerations that would actually call the case’s status as a
superprecedent into question. For example, long-standing and unquestioned
precedent may address merely once-important matters that no longer have legal
relevance.64 More controversially, some important open-ended multi-factor
balancing tests may, precisely because of their manipulability to a broad range
of ends, avoid meaningful challenge, but at the price of not really controlling
legal outcomes in a large number of cases.65
Judge Barrett then indicates that the force of superprecedents crucially
“derives from the people, who have taken their validity off the Court’s agenda.
Litigants do not challenge them. If they did, no inferior federal court or state
court would take them seriously, at least in the absence of any indicia that the
broad consensus supporting a precedent was crumbling.”66 Or, as otherwise put
by Barrett and Nagle, superprecedent status for cases flows not from the Court’s
decision to afford them precedential strength, but from “the People’s choice to
accept them.”67 This suggests both that a court cannot successfully bootstrap a
controversial case into superprecedent status by its own declarations68 and that

60
61

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.

62

Barrett, supra note 25, at 1734; see also Barrett & Nagle, supra note 25, at 2–3.
Barrett, supra note 25, at 1734. As a possible corollary, there may be cases such that
disagreement with the outcome or basic thrust thereof would disqualify Supreme Court nominees.
See Kende, supra note 27.
63

64
Consider, for example, broad constitutional or regulatory case holdings as to once dominant
but now completely obsolete technologies or methods of communication.
65
For example, Mathews v. Eldridge has been cited, per a Westlaw case search, more than
14,000 times, emerging largely unscathed. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The
Eldridge three-part balancing test embodies evident common sense, but at a level of generality,
and of manipulability, too high to meaningfully constrain the outcome of seriously contestable
cases. See id. at 335.
66
Barrett, supra note 25, at 1735.
67
68

Barrett & Nagle, supra note 25, at 3.
See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
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we should not think of a case with elite and institutional level support as a
superprecedent if that case lacks popular support.
Barrett and Nagle thus follow most writers in assuming that what
typically distinguishes a superprecedent from a non-superprecedent is a matter
of a case’s insusceptibility, or likely insusceptibility, to overruling.69 Whether a
case could lose superprecedent status only through increased vulnerability to
overruling is a crucial question taken up below.70
A number of writers think of superprecedence through the
“entrenchment” or “embeddedness,” in some distinctive way or degree, of the
case in question.71 Beyond the idea of some form of embeddedness, observers
also raise questions as to whether, for example, the case in question counts as a
“landmark,”72 or has seen “repeated reaffirmations.”73 Perhaps, on this latter
view, a case whose stature has discouraged any challenges, and has thus had no
occasion to be reaffirmed, would count necessarily as a “landmark” case.74
It is also possible to characterize superprecedents partly in terms of the
process leading up to the decision in question. Thus Matthew E.K. Hall
recommends asking whether the case in question was “the product of a protracted
political struggle that engaged the public in a period of higher lawmaking.”75 Of
course, we may be likely to dispute whether any given decision really reflects
some extraordinary process of vaguely defined higher lawmaking. 76 And if we

69

See Barrett, supra note 25; see also Barrett & Nagle, supra note 25, at 2–3.

70

See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 12, at 1239 (“These precedents seem deeply embedded in
current institutional practice, such that overruling them would wreak much social disruption.”)
(adding the condition that “no one wants to see them overturned”); Glen Staszewski, Precedent
and Disagreement, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1037 (2018) (referring to “entrenched legal principles
that are . . . no longer the subject of serious deliberation, even though reasonable minds could
potentially differ on their validity or whether they provide the best solution to a problem”)
(reviewing KOZEL, supra note 11); Daniel Solove, The Problem with Superprecedent,
CONCURRING
OPINIONS
(Oct.
30,
2005),
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/10/the_problem_wit.html (“The notion of superprecedent is that there are cases that
are so firmly entrenched that they ought not to be overturned despite being in error. Roe v. Wade
is the superprecedent that most have in mind.”).
71

72

Richard H. Fallon, Constitutional Precedents Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist
Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2008).
73

Id.
See id. “Landmark” status is presumably achieved, in typical cases, only over a period of
time, whether the case is repeatedly reaffirmed, or left essentially unchallenged and in that sense
not reaffirmed.
74

75

Matthew E.K. Hall, Bringing Down Brown: Super Precedents, Myths of Rediscovery, and
the Retroactive Canonization of Brown v. Board of Education, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 665, 673 (2010).
76

See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266–94 (1991) (seeking to
contrast “normal politics” with “higher lawmaking”); Michael J. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest
for a Common Law of Higher Lawmaking, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1731 (1999) (reviewing
ACKERMAN, supra).
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decided, for example, that Marbury was not the product of a prolonged public
political struggle amounting to higher lawmaking, we would then have to choose
between excluding Marbury as a superprecedent and revising Hall’s
recommended understanding thereof.
Other creative approaches are possible as well. Colin Starger thus
suggests that a case does, or should, have superprecedent status when not only
its own rule is widely accepted,77 but when the second-order rules for interpreting
and implementing that case are also agreed upon, such that overruling the
underlying first-order case “has become unthinkable.”78 This approach thus
might be considered one of focusing on multi-layered entrenchment.79
This implementation-oriented approach to superprecedent status,
however, seems to be in tension with yet another intriguing approach to defining
superprecedence. Allison Hayward has thus suggested that “perhaps the true test
of a superprecedent is not whether there has been substantial reliance on it, . . .
or whether it settles a question for all time, but whether it can be cited in support
of conflicting conclusions.”80 One ironic implication of Hayward’s approach
seems to be that superprecedent status can be associated with the case’s own lack
of constraining power on later judicial outcomes, perhaps through vagueness,
manipulability, or indeterminacy of implication and inference.
We might instead think of a typical superprecedent as exerting control
over a broad range of legal outcomes, as perhaps in Marbury’s firmly
establishing judicial review over congressional judgment on matters of
constitutional interpretation.81 Marbury thus dictates outcomes at that level of
generality. We know in advance whether Congress or the Supreme Court will
win such a conflict in a given case. But it may also seem, as Hayward suggests,82
that some candidates for superprecedent status are not far from mere formulaic
injunctions for judges to take the relevant factors into account and strike a
sensible balance.83 Such cases are thus often citable on either side of the case.84
Finally, consider the suggestion of Professor Mark Kende that
superprecedent status may reflect a case’s vitality and impact on the law and on
the practices of lay institutions and persons.85 Particularly in light of Bakke’s
77

Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding Dialectic
of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 77, 149 (2012).
78
79
80
81

Id.
See supra note 71.
Hayward, supra note 49, at 205.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

82

See Hayward, supra note 49, at 205.
See, for example, the discussion of the three-factor balancing test in the procedural due
process case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also text accompanying supra
note 65.
83

84
85

See Hayward, supra note 49, at 205.
See Kende, supra note 27, at 18.
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apparent fragility,86 Kende refers87 in particular to the initially isolated opinion
by Justice Powell in the Bakke case.88 We can easily see how a case’s current
vitality and its effects on case law and daily practices might well bear upon the
question of superprecedent status. It is less clear, though, why superprecedent
status should be associated with initially vulnerable but now flourishing
opinions89 as opposed to unanimous opinions.90 Perhaps the idea is that initially
vulnerable but now widely influential opinions have shown a distinctive
hardiness that bodes well for the future of the opinion.91
There is thus a wide variety of partly conflicting understandings of what
a superprecedent is or should be. The lack of a complete consensus on such definitional matters is not, however, as disturbing as the unresolved and typically
unrecognized fundamental issues unavoidably raised by the idea of a superprecedent. We address several of these fundamental issues below.92 But first, we
should consider whether a focus on specific commonly proposed superprecedents themselves, as distinct from theoretical accounts of superprecedents in general, meaningfully contributes to our understanding of superprecedents. As it
turns out, at the level of individual case candidates for superprecedent status, we
encounter a series of distinct paradoxes. These various case-level paradoxes
should, even if they are surprising or counterintuitive, inform our understanding
of the idea of a superprecedent.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE IDEA OF A SUPERPRECEDENT THROUGH COMMONLY
PROPOSED CASES: THE PERVASIVENESS OF PARADOX
Given the inadequacies of and conflicts among the above accounts of
superprecedence, it is natural to consider the situation on the ground in the form
of particular cases typically proposed for superprecedent status. In the absence
of any more systematic approach, we now briefly consider some of the lessons
to be drawn from the cases, presented in roughly chronological order. As it turns
out, paradox in one form or another is a recurring theme. Among the most
obvious early candidates, on mainstream theories, for superprecedent status are
the cases of Marbury, establishing, roughly, judicial review for the

86

See id.

87

See id.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–321 (1978).

88
89

See id.
See, for example, the unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
91
By loose analogy, we might credit the Powell opinion in Bakke with having a more robust
“immune system” than that of a typical unanimous judicial opinion, all else equal.
92
See infra Part IV.
90
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constitutionality of federal statutes,93 and Martin, establishing the Supreme Court
as typically the final judge of state court decisions as to federal law.94
A. Marbury v. Madison
Marbury is especially distinctive in that there is a sense in which it
would, remarkably, be logically impossible for the Court to overrule Marbury’s
basic principle. There is thus something of a paradox here. To see this, think of
the Marbury holding as that the Supreme Court has the final authority on
constitutional questions, including those of separation of powers. The Marbury
Court ironically arrogated to itself this authority in the context of disclaiming the
power to hear a particular case.95 More ironically, though, the general power of
judicial review is, in a sense, not disclaimable through ordinary adjudication. For
the Court to overrule, and deny, a principle of judicial review would be
inescapably—however paradoxically—to retain and reassert that very principle
at a higher but still ultimately authoritative level.
Thus, the Marbury Court famously declares that above and beyond the
views, oaths, and proper functions of the other branches, “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department96 to say what the law is.”97 For the
Court to reverse itself on this point would, ironically, merely reassert at a higher
level its own continuing final authority on such matters. The Court would still
have the final word. We might thus think of the Court’s hypothetical overruling
of Marbury as saying something like “we lack final judgment on such a question,
and that is our universally binding, higher-order final judgment on just such
questions.”
Of course, we can easily imagine alternative constitutional regimes with
any and all variations from our familiar form of judicial review, including weak
and strong forms, subject matter limitations, differences in institutional
arrangements, or having no judicial review at all.98 There is obviously a broad

93

See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

94

See generally Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176–77.

95
96
97

And, ultimately, the Supreme Court in particular.
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.

98
From among the vast literature of the merits and disadvantages of one form of judicial review or another, see, for example, LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Larry Alexander, What Is the Problem of Judicial Review?, 31
AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply
to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1013 (2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy
Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); Michael J. Perry, A Theory of Judicial Review
(Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16-396, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624978; Mark Tushnet, Against Judicial Review (Harvard Law Sch.,
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spectrum of alternatives to a Marbury-like judicial review regime, along any
number of dimensions, with a nearly infinite number of possible gradations along
the spectra.99 There is no paradox involved in imagining any such variation in
operation. Some viable alternatives will be closely akin to the Marbury holding
itself. Other alternatives will be more distant from Marbury in principle and
practical effect.
This raises the broader question, addressed further below,100 of what it
means to not follow, or to no longer follow, a supposed superprecedent. Legal
writers commonly refer, without any of the necessary clarification, to something
like the difficulty or impropriety of overruling, reversing, overturning, or
somehow not following a purported superprecedent. But this might refer to
anything from the extreme of figuratively standing a superprecedent on its head
or adopting some diametrically opposite approach, to vaguely undermining, to
significantly modifying the holding, or else to doing what amounts to
fine-tuning, adjusting, or perhaps to merely qualifying or minimally limiting the
purported superprecedent. The basic problem here is one of whether any, if not
all, of these varied responses to a case are compatible with the case’s continuing
superprecedent status.
B. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee
In contrast, the case of Martin, as a purported superprecedent presents a
looser but still quite real form of paradox. Let us assume that Martin held,
however oversimplified, that the Supreme Court can serve as a court of final
appeal on significant questions of federal law, including questions of
constitutional law, even if those questions are raised and decided initially by state
courts.101
We can imagine a judicial decision, in the form of an “anti-Martin,” that
instead allowed each state to be sovereign and unreviewable in its own
interpretation of the federal Commerce Clause, and in that respect restoring
something like the obvious deadweight efficiency losses suffered under the

Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-20, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1368857; Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Review and Judicial Supremacy
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-57,
2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2510550. For a classic account of Marbury, the case itself, see
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1. See also
Larry Kramer, We the People, BOS. REV. (Mar. 2004), https://bostonreview.net/archives/BR29.1/kramer.html.
99
See the various international and hypothetical examples discussed in supra note 98.
100

See supra Part II; infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 55; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990).
101
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Articles of Confederation.102 But in practice, over time, the basic Martin rule
would, unlike most other overruled precedents, have an especially strong
“buoyancy,” or a systematic, predictable, and persistent tendency to reassert
itself in one way or another.103 Rules that are patently and generally inefficient,
in substantial measure, from all relevant parties’ perspectives, strongly invite
their being somehow contracted around or otherwise negated.104
The basic Martin principle and its hypothetical replacement are thus not
essentially two different ways of slicing up a fixed distributional pie. Martin is
not so much about winners and losers at the level of individual states or
commercial enterprises as it is about avoiding tempting, but ultimately generally
self-defeating, economic behavior. The “deeper” that any anti-Martin case
sought to “sink” the basic Martin principle regarding commerce, the greater the
tendency for that principle or something akin to Martin to rise again in the
surface. Obviously much more efficient and collectively beneficial rules tend,
especially, to thus somehow reassert themselves.
Professor H. Jefferson Powell has already argued that “Martin’s holding
that the Supreme Court may constitutionally review state court holdings on
federal law matters is so foundational105 an element of the American legal system
that it is difficult for us to take rejection of it seriously.”106 Our point is that
Martin is not simply quite popular, taken for granted, off the agenda, or
supported by powerful groups. Rather, to change the metaphor, any attempt to
do away with the basic Martin principle would predictably boomerang for
independent and inescapable basic reasons, as recognized in part by the Martin
Court itself107 and, then, to at least some degree by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.108 The distinctive “buoyance,” or the distinctively strong

102

For discussion of the obvious costs of allowing each state to read the federal Commerce
Clause to its own initial advantage, to the prejudice of other states generally, and ultimately thereby
to its own prejudice, see H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
103
See generally Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA L. REV.
1697 (1996).
104
105

See id.
But for critical discussion of this popular metaphor, see infra Part IV.

106
H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 675
(1993).
107
Martin itself observes that “[t]he Constitution has presumed . . . that . . . state interests . . .
might some times obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice.” 14 U.S. 304, 347 (1816); see also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801–1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 682
(1982).
108
Justice Holmes declared:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to
declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if
we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states. For one
in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are not
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“boomerang quality,” of Martin is thus not reducible to merely the popularity or
elite-level support of Martin at the time of its hypothetical overruling.
To briefly review, then, Marbury is in an important sense logically not
judicially overruleable, whatever the results of any judicial turning away from
the Marbury holding.109 Martin is in an entirely different sense not practically
overruleable over time, given the monumental and unavoidable structural
incentives to reassert and restore a uniform commerce regulation rule at least
strongly akin to that of Martin.110
C. Brown v. Board of Education
Brown, in contrast, presents yet another kind of paradoxical
complication as a presumed superprecedent. Brown has itself divided over time
into, on the one hand, a non-overruleable symbolic and expressive public
message and, on the other, a legal rule with shifting, disputable, and perhaps only
quite limited purchase on the actual circumstances of public-school education.
Thus, in a sense, Brown is the epitome of what many writers have in
mind when they suggest that some cases are, or should be regarded as,
superprecedents.111 But while a broad rejection of the symbolic or expressive
dimension of Brown would be to invoke something akin to a secular equivalent
of the taboo,112 there can also be serious question as to how different patterns of
public-school racial segregation would be today if Brown itself had been written
differently, in any number of respects. We understand today that at minimum, an
earnest judicial proclamation of a constitutional principle may not be
successfully translated, even over time, into daily social and cultural in

trained to national views, and how often action is taken that embodies what the
Commerce Clause was meant to end.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at a Dinner of the
Harvard Law School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913) (quoted in Felix Frankfurter, The
Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 HARV. L. REV. 683, 688 (1916)). For discussion of
the “race to the bottom” state regulatory coordination problem, see Charles C. Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588–89 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
109
See supra notes 93–100.
110

See supra notes 93–108.
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1789 (2007)
(“[A]ny lawyer . . . who questions Brown’s legitimacy places himself outside the jurisprudential
mainstream.”) (noting a “long delay before Brown achieved its canonical status”); Hall, supra note
75, at 657–58 (“[S]enators and scholars seem to agree: if there are superprecedents in American
constitutional law, Brown v. Board of Education is one of them.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Two
Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 543 (1999) (“Brown . . . which was a
controversial decision in 1954 . . . is the third rail of judicial nomination: touch it and you die.”);
Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown® Do for You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle Over the
Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1049 (2009).
111

112
See supra note 111; see also Taboo, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (2018),
www.oed.com/view/Entry/196824?rskey=EkeZVI&result=1#eid.
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constitutional practice.113 Proclamation is not implementation. And without
entering here into the merits of the debate, it is clear that 60 years after
segregationist “massive resistance,”114 the realistic impact of Brown on
public-school racial segregation may be surprisingly modest.115
Brown might thus reasonably qualify as both the quintessential
superprecedent and as a remarkable disappointment with regard to its practical
execution and impact.116 Here, the paradox thus takes the form of a symbolically
important case opinion often taken to be among the clearest of superprecedents,
but which has, arguably, only a remarkably limited gravitational influence on the
real world events most central to its purported scope. We would hardly expect
this latter inefficacy to be characteristic of any superprecedent, let alone a
purportedly central such superprecedent.
D. Griswold v. Connecticut
Finally, there is a fourth kind of paradox that may attend purported case
superprecedents. It is possible for a purported superprecedent to govern, again

113
See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
114
See generally The Southern Manifesto and “Massive Resistance” to Brown, NAACP LEGAL
DEF. & EDUC. FUND, https://www.naacpldf.org/ldf-celebrates-60th-anniversary-brown-v-boardeducation/southern-manifesto-massive-resistance-brown/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2019).
115
Some of the causal responsibility in this respect has been imputed to the equivocality and
limited ambition of Brown’s implementing cases, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). For broader discussion, see CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(2004); GARY ORFIELD ET AL., BROWN AT 62: SCHOOL SEGREGATION BY RACE, POVERTY, AND STATE
1 (2016), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-62-school-segregation-by-race-poverty-and-state/Brown-at-62-final-corrected2.pdf (referring to the “spreading and deepening segregation in our nation’s schools”); SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005);
WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS
REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2002); Moriah
Balingit, Florida’s Schools—Once Integration’s Great Hope—Are Resegregating, WASH. POST
(Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2017/10/10/floridasschools-once-integrations-great-hope-are-resegregating/?noredirect=on; Emma Brown, On the
Anniversary of Brown v. Board, New Evidence that U.S. Schools Are Resegregating, WASH. POST
(May 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/05/17/on-the-anniversary-of-brown-v-board-new-evidence-that-u-s-schools-are-resegregating/ (“Poor, black and
Hispanic children are becoming increasingly isolated from their white, affluent peers in the nation’s public schools . . . .”); Ronald Brownstein, How Brown v. Board of Education Changed—
and Didn’t Change—American Education, ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/04/two-milestones-in-education/361222/; Will Stancil, School
Segregation Is Not a Myth, ATLANTIC (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/03/school-segregation-is-not-a-myth/555614/ (“Racially divided schools are a major
and intensifying problem for American education—maybe even a crisis.”).
116
See supra note 115.
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however paradoxically, an area of the law where no Supreme Court or other
precedent, let alone a superprecedent, was or is genuinely required. Consider, in
this regard, the substantive due process case of Griswold.117 Griswold is known
for Justice William O. Douglas’s citation of a number of distinct enumerated
constitutional rights118 as collectively implying the unconstitutionality, under a
substantive due process concern for privacy or autonomy, 119 of a Connecticut
statute prohibiting the marital use, for the particular purpose of preventing
conception,120 of contraceptives.121 Justice Douglas’s opinion emphasizes in
particular the nobility and significance of the “bilateral loyalty”122 involved in
marriage as an institutional relationship.123
We may quite reasonably assume that the influence of Griswold on later
jurisprudence, and even on the broader culture, suffices for superprecedent
status.124 Opposition to Griswold might tend to derail a nomination to the
Supreme Court.125 But the actually necessary holding or ratio decidendi126 of
Griswold is narrow and indeed uncontroversial at the level of contemporary
morality and politics, as applied to direct violators rather than to accessories.127
Thus Justice Douglas asks in Griswold whether we would “allow” the
police to search “the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives.”128 To deny the police this general authority, however,
does not require any creative aggregation of only loosely related constitutional

117

381 U.S. 479 (1965); supra text accompanying note 45.

118

See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–86.
See id.

119
120
121

See id. at 480.
See id.

122

Id. at 486.
See id. at 485–86; see also William W. Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitutional
Review from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1677–78 (1989).
124
For a sense of that influence, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel, How Conflict Entrenched
the Right to Privacy, 124 YALE L.J.: F. (2015), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/how-conflict-entrenched-the-right-to-privacy (recounting, in particular, the subsequent validation, reliance
thereon, and the expansionist case law); Evan Bernick, Griswold at 50: An (Incomplete) Constitutional Revolution and Its Meaning Today, HUFFINGTON POST (June 9, 2015, 11:43 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/griswold-at-50-an-incompl_b_7544458?.
125
See Gerhardt, Super Precedent, supra note 50, at 1220; Tamar Lewin, The Bork Hearings;
Bork Is Assailed Over Remarks on Contraceptive Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 1987),
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/19/us/the-bork-hearings-bork-is-assailed-over-remarks-oncontraceptive-ruling.html.
126
See, classically, Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE
L.J. 161, 161 (1930).
127
As to the complications of accessory liability in Griswold-type cases, see the remarks of
Harriet Pilpel reported in Lewin, supra note 125.
128
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
123
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rights.129 Much more narrowly, the law could simply presume that officially
invading the marital, or any other, bedroom under Griswold-type circumstances
would be considered unconstitutional as an unreasonable search.130 And even this
rule would be far broader than is actually necessary, given the relevant statute’s
unpoliceable distinction between the use of a contraceptive for the particular
purpose of contraception131 and use for any other purpose, including preventing
disease.
Thus, the Griswold case does not leave us with a choice merely between
Griswold as a broad substantive due process privacy precedent132 and denying
relief to the defendants. Griswold-type enforcement against principals would
almost inevitably violate some provision explicitly enumerated in the
Constitution.133 The statute in Griswold was inescapably unconstitutional on
prosaic and uncontroversial search and seizure grounds.134 Griswold may be
deemed a superprecedent in view of its sustained influence and expansion in
important contexts.135 But this has little to do with what would be reasonably
necessary in order to hold typically unconstitutional the statute in question.136
Thus, Griswold offers yet another form of paradox to those forms already
encountered above.137
Overall, then, neither the major theoretical approaches to superprecedent
status138 nor the typically cited purported superprecedents themselves139 leave us
with any clarity as to the idea of a judicial superprecedent or of its jurisprudential
value. Below, this Article explores three important underlying reasons for the
continuing lack of clarity and genuine usefulness of the idea of a superprecedent.
Unless and until these underlying problems can be successfully addressed, we

129

See id. at 484.

130

For a start, see id. at 485.
See id. at 480.

131
132

Griswold is, merely for example, crucially cited in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973),
in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–65 (2003), and in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2598 (2015).
133
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (The statute may be “uncommonly
silly,” “obviously unenforceable,” “unwise, or even asinine” but, as supposedly in Griswold, not
unconstitutional.).
134
See id. at 484–85; supra note 130 and accompanying text. The possibility of a testimonial
marital privilege further limits the need for a broad holding in Griswold.
135
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a sense of the debate over
whether Roe does, or should, qualify as a superprecedent, see, for example, Fallon, supra note 72,
at 1149; Sinclair, supra note 28, at 408; Hatch, supra note 21; Rosen, supra note 21.
136
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85 (majority opinion); supra note 130 and accompanying
text.
137
See supra notes 93–116.
138
139

See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss1/7

18

Wright: Downgrading Superprecedents

2019]

DOWNGRADING SUPERPRECEDENTS

163

are best advised to, at a minimum, downgrade the significance of claims to
superprecedential status.
IV. SUPERPRECEDENCE: THREE CRUCIAL UNDERLYING PROBLEMS
The first underlying problem to be recognized is that our general
“picture” of superprecedents is incomplete, if not crucially defective. This is
because our mental image of a superprecedent relies, often explicitly,140 on such
a case as being considered “foundational.”141 Even when we do not describe a
superprecedent as somehow “foundational,” we commonly substitute the near
synonym of the superprecedent as “bedrock.”142 The description of a
superprecedent as somehow “foundational” may seem uncontroversial, and even
inevitable. This metaphor, however, is at least as misleading as it is helpful.
Consider, by way of loose analogy, the ongoing dispute among
philosophers as to whether knowledge must ultimately rest upon some
foundational, bedrock, or literally basic truth. Some philosophers are indeed in
this sense foundationalists.143 But certainly not all philosophers rely in this
context on the idea of foundations, or of bedrock.144 In particular, many
philosophers “favor a holistic picture of justification which does not distinguish
between basic or foundational and non-basic or derived beliefs, treating, rather,
all our beliefs as equal members”145 or as members of a “web of belief.”146 On
140
See, e.g., Barrett & Nagle, supra note 25 (multi-dimensional foundationalism); Gerhardt,
supra note 26, at 1206–17 (focusing, respectively, on foundational institutional practices, foundational doctrines, and foundational decisions); Hayward, supra note 49, at 202; Sinclair, supra note
28, at 402; Jack M. Balkin, Don’t Talk to Me About Superprecedents, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 30,
2005), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/10/dont-talk-to-me-about-superprecedents.html.
141

See supra note 140.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1173, 1180–84 (2006) (referring to “bedrock precedents”). Professor Farber then defines “bedrock
precedents” as “precedents that have become the foundation for large areas of important doctrine,”
and thus relies on the metaphor of a foundation. Id. at 1180. For discussion of Professor Farber on
this point, see Barnett, supra note 12, at 1235–38.
142

143
For background in the context of the idea of a justified belief, see Ali Hasan & Richard
Fumerton, Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct.
24, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/ (citing, classically, the thought of
Aristotle and Descartes). See also William Alston, Two Types of Foundationalism, 73 J. PHIL. 165
(1976); Timm Triplett, Recent Work on Foundationalism, 27 AM. PHIL. Q. 93 (1990).
144
See, e.g., Erik Olsson, Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 3, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/.
145
Actually, not all members of the set of mutually coherent beliefs need be equal, in the sense
of being as directly linked to as many other beliefs, or to as many diverse beliefs. Similarly, not all
judicial case precedents need be directly linked to as many others, or as many diverse precedents,
as others.
157
See Olsson, supra note 144 (quoting W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF
(1970)).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 7

164

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122

this opposing coherentist approach, “what justifies our beliefs is ultimately the
way in which they hang together or dovetail so as to produce a coherent set.”147
None is foundational, basic, or bedrock.
This analogy suggests that in order for a case to be unusually secure and
unusually influential, as we might expect of a superprecedent, the case need not
be more “foundational”148 than other cases, or amount to judicial “bedrock.”149
Without foundational or bedrock status, a case might instead still be both directly
and indirectly linked to a large number and variety of cases deemed to be of
significance, in a network of overall collective validation.150 While we might say
that the networked superprecedent “supports” other cases, other cases may in
turn crucially contribute to the creditability, vitality, influence, and persistence
of the presumed superprecedent case.151
Coherentism thus allows us, by analogy, to view the problems of
superprecedence quite differently. Merely for example, consider the controversy
over whether Roe is or should be a superprecedent.152 A focus on whether Roe is
“foundational” or “bedrock,” as these terms are typically used,153 is crucially
misleading. Roe is obviously no more “foundational” than many other cases, in
that is in the relevant sense itself crucially based on the foundation of prior cases,
including Griswold154 and the more equal protection-oriented contraception case
of Eisenstadt v. Baird.155 Arguably, without Griswold, Eisenstadt, and other
cases, Roe would not have then been decided as it was. But if we say that
Eisenstadt was foundational with respect to Roe, we clearly must also say that
Griswold was in turn foundational to Eisenstadt.156 Of all these cases, we might
find Griswold, perhaps, to be the most structurally important. But then, similarly,

147
Id.; see also Laurence Bonjour, The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge, 30 PHIL.
STUD. 281 (1976); Michael R. DePaul, Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics, 96 MIND
463 (1987); Michael Williams, Coherence, Justification, and Truth, 34 REV. METAPHYSICS 243
(1980). In legal contexts, see, for example, Ken Kress, Why No Judge Should Be a Dworkinian
Coherentist, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1375 (1999); Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L.
REV. 273 (1992); R. George Wright, Two Models of Constitutional Adjudication, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 1357 (1991) (discussing the use of foundationalism and coherentism in American constitutional law).
148
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 144–148 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra note 132.
See supra note 143.
As noted in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
See id. at 445–46.
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we must say that Griswold was constructed on the “foundations” of numerous
privacy-related cases.157
If Roe is not foundational because it rests on the layered foundations of
supporting cases, and cannot therefore be a superprecedent, then we must also
say that Griswold, as similarly resting on the foundation of other cases, also
cannot be a superprecedent. Now, one might in the end want, for other reasons,
to deny superprecedent status to either or both of Roe and Griswold. But for most
practical purposes, it seems too easy, if not otherwise inadvisable, to deny
superprecedent status to both Roe and Griswold even partially on this dubious
basis.
In particular, if we choose to deny superprecedent status to, say, the
Griswold case, we should have something to say not only about Griswold’s
largely unchallenged status, but about Griswold’s dense network of strong
mutual connectedness and mutual supportiveness158 among the expanding range
of obviously important substantive due process, privacy, and other sorts of cases.
Reliance, in general, on images of foundations, or bedrock status, in order to
determine superprecedent status is thus grossly misleading.
The second basic problem that plagues discussions of superprecedent
status is the typical indifference, in such discussions, as to whether
superprecedence is primarily a descriptive matter, or primarily a normative
matter, or some alternative thereto.159 There is, clearly, often an important
difference between the processes of describing and of normatively evaluating.160
We can easily imagine someone who argues that a personally preferred
case is, or should be, recognized as a superprecedent, where that person’s
motivation is purely strategic or political in nature. The logic in so arguing would
be that the case’s being widely recognized as a superprecedent would further
enhance the prestige and legitimacy of the case and reduce the chances of the
case’s being further challenged, let alone overruled. On such an agenda, the point

157

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–86 (1965). Griswold relies on, in particular,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), also authored by Justice Douglas.
158
For an exploration of the related phenomenon of “cumulative case” arguments, see R.
George Wright, Cumulative Case Legal Arguments and the Justification of Academic Affirmative
Action, 23 PACE L. REV. 1 (2002).
159
As of September 11, 2019, a Westlaw search indicates that Griswold has been cited by more
than 1,663 federal court cases, in various subject matter areas, including, for example, the housing
ordinance occupancy limits case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977),
and the public school library book free speech case of Board of Education, Island Trees Union
Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982).
160
As discussed in the context of the classic is-ought distinction. For background, see, classically, 2 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. III, pt. I, § 1 (1817). For merely one
account among many, see Max Black, The Gap Between “Is” and “Should”, 73 PHIL. REV. 165
(1964). More critically, see John R. Searle, How to Derive “Ought” From “Is”, 73 PHIL. REV. 43
(1964).
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of a recognized superprecedent status would be to immediately and inescapably
enhance the status and protection afforded to a preferred case precedent.
This political strategy might be less helpful, however, if we think of a
superprecedent instead in primarily descriptive terms. Suppose, for the sake of
simplicity, we think of a superprecedent merely in terms of the extraordinary
persistence of its influence. Persistence and influence may, possibly, in the end
be somehow associated with positive normative value. But one would need some
separate, additional theory establishing that association. The bad can persist. The
bad can be influential. In the meantime, we would have to acknowledge that
important, but morally unjustified, judicial precedents have also held sway for
many decades.161 A case could be influential for good or for ill. The broad
question is thus how much, if any, normative luster should be built into the very
idea of a superprecedent.
The very rough analogy to this judicial problem from philosophy is to
the philosophical distinction between evaluatively “thin” concepts and
evaluatively “thick” concepts.162 The important idea for our purposes is that some
concepts seem to straddle a presumed line between their function in merely
describing and their function in normatively evaluating, thus partaking of both
descriptive and normative elements. Consider, for example, the idea that
someone has acted “courageously.”163 We might initially think of this as largely
descriptive of what someone has done. We think that we can “see” courage in
action. But to describe an act as courageous also seems inescapably to convey an
evaluative judgment of approval or admiration, at least in some respect or to
some degree.164
The problem in this respect with superprecedence status is that little
attention has been paid to whether, or how much, the idea of a superprecedent is
like that of acting courageously. Are we to first settle upon whether a given case
is a superprecedent, and only then begin the normative task of deciding whether
to strongly and distinctly respect the superprecedent in question? Or are we to
instead believe that once we have settled upon a definition of “superprecedent,”
and properly classified some case thereunder, most of the crucial normative

161

As merely one example, note that Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), remained the
law of the land, even as to public schools, for 58 years until Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Chae Chen Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case),
130 U.S. 581 (1889).
162
See generally Michael Smith, On the Nature and Significance of the Distinction Between
Thick and Thin Ethical Concepts, in THICK CONCEPTS 97 (Simon Kirchin ed., 2013); Simon
Kirchin, Thick Evaluation, 128 MIND 954 (2017); Pekka Vayryen, Thick Ethical Concepts, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 21, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thick-ethical-concepts/.
163
See, e.g., Vayryen, supra note 162.
164
This may partially explain why some of us are unwilling to describe as “courageous” an act
in the service of what we deem an evil cause.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss1/7

22

Wright: Downgrading Superprecedents

2019]

DOWNGRADING SUPERPRECEDENTS

167

questions regarding the case itself165 have thereby been already answered?
Otherwise put, is the main jurisprudential and political struggle over what does
or should count as a superprecedent, or does much of the crucial jurisprudential
and political struggle remain to take place even after a particular case has been
classified as a superprecedent?
The third and final crucial problem that plagues discussions of
superprecedent status involves the typical indifference to, or neglect of, the wide
range of possible judicial and other responses to a presumed superprecedent.
Even an unanimously endorsed superprecedent may see important fluctuations
over time in its “gravitational field” between lesser and greater influence on other
cases and contexts. That a case remains a superprecedent tells us little about these
important possibilities.
More important, though, is the lack of attention generally paid to the
range of the possible critical responses to purported superprecedents. Unless we
choose to define a superprecedent in such a fashion that it can never be subject
to any future critique, we must attend to the fact that there is no unique single
way to critically respond to an established precedent. Even the idea of
“overruling” a precedent, super or otherwise, can take various forms, with
varying effects.166 It would only minimally overstate matters to say that every
“overruling” of a case is unlike any other. Even a superprecedent could be
overruled, while leaving the world much as it is.167 But overruling a
superprecedent might instead enshrine a diametrically opposed world-view,168 or
perhaps leave the future of the relevant law open, to one degree or another.169
Of even greater significance, though, is that a superprecedent can be
limited in any of various ways and degrees without being overruled. A
superprecedent could thus be distinguished, “chipped away” at,170 confined to its
facts, somehow undermined, bypassed, occasionally ignored, conspicuously or

165

If not also its proper reach, or extension, in practice.

166

Thus, Brown v. Board of Education did not do to the Plessy v. Ferguson precedent what
Lawrence v. Texas did to Bowers v. Hardwick in the area of sexual privacy. See Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Somin,
supra note 49 (“Even in Brown, the Supreme Court did not overrule Plessy.”).
167

Note the range of paradoxes explored in supra Part III.
While Bowers was hardly at any point a superprecedent, note the degree of value inversion
implied by its rejection in Lawrence. See supra text accompanying note 166. Consider also the
remarkable “flipping” of Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), by West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), on the question of a
public-school student’s constitutional right to not salute the flag.
168

169

Thus, Brown itself, on Brown’s own reasoning, does not tell us much about the
constitutional viability of Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine outside the context of education.
See Somin, supra note 50. But see Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (tersely applying
the Brown outcome to municipal golf courses).
170
See Solove, supra note 71 (distinguishing a strategy of “chipping away” at a superprecedent
from seeking its radical reversal).
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inconspicuously not invoked in a later context,171 or variously adjusted172 at the
margins.173 And there is as yet no clear theory as to when any of these more
incremental changes may be appropriate with respect to a presumably continuing
superprecedent. Relatedly, there is also no reasonably clear theory as to when a
case’s superprecedent status is or should be lost as a result, cumulative or
otherwise, of any of the various limiting responses to such cases.174

Thus, the well-known and widely discussed free speech “fighting words” case of Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), while never overruled, has apparently also never formed
the basis of any later Supreme Court holding. For criticism of Chaplinsky, see, for example, Burton
Caine, The Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First
Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 443 (2004).
172
Consider how the iconic public-school student free speech case of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), has been gradually “hedged about”
by various limitations, as in Bethel School District. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (lewd, vulgar,
indecent, or patently offensive student speech); Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1988) (curricular speech arguably endorsed by the school); and Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393 (2007) (student speech arguably advocating illegal drug use).
173
If Roe is considered a superprecedent, we might judge Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), to have meaningfully modified or adjusted Roe, while
leaving a “core” component of Roe intact. For further such adjustment or clarification, see Whole
Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (refining Casey on questions of undue
burdens and substantial obstacles to abortion access). See also, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ind. &
Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 888 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2018). For discussion
of possible legal consequences of an overturning of Roe, see Ann Althouse, Stepping Out of
Professor Fallon’s Puzzle Box: A Response to “If Roe Were Overruled”, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 761
(2007); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a PostRoe World, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 611 (2007). For recent surveys of possible state-level responses, see
Joy Fox et al., What Could Happen If Roe v. Wade Gets Struck Down?, WASH. POST (Nov. 2,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/abortion-rights-supreme-court/;
Evan Halper, If a Reshaped Supreme Court Tosses Abortion Decisions Back to States, Several
Would Move Fast to Outlaw the Procedures, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2018, 5:08 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-abortion-20180628-story.html; One-Third of the 1,193
State Abortion Restrictions Since Roe v. Wade Have Been Enacted in the Past Seven Years,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/infographic/2018/trends-stateabortion-restrictions-2017.
174
One general, if also rather vague, possibility would be that at least some superprecedents
have the important role of symbolically expressing who or what we are, or what we aspire to
collectively, as a people. We can certainly imagine, for example, someone pointing to Brown and
saying that this is, in one respect, who or what we are, and that Plessy v. Ferguson is “not who we
are.” A problem here is that in some cases, declaring that this is “not who we are” may impliedly
concede that this is indeed who we too often are. See Tim Dowling, “This Is Not Who We Are” Is
American for: “This Is Sort of Who We Are”, GUARDIAN (London) (Mar. 10, 2015, 4:40 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/10/this-is-not-who-we-are-americanlindsay-graham. More crucially, declarations as to who we are, or who we are not, may be
question-begging, preemptive of (further) discussion, or an elevation of established tradition over
criticality or the pursuit of more objective truth. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Truth and Politics:
A
Symposium on Peter Simpson’s Political Illiberalism: A Defense of Freedom, 62 AM. J.
JURIS. 1, 1 (2017).
171
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V. CONCLUSION
The idea of a judicial superprecedent has assumed an important role in
constitutional theory and in judicial politics. Unfortunately, there remains an
unusual degree of uncertainty, dispute, and sheer unresolved conflict over how a
superprecedent should be characterized. As it turns out, paradoxically, one or
more of the mostly commonly proposed superprecedent cases are either
technically not overruleable,175 or remarkably “buoyant” in that any overruling
would inevitably generate irresistible systemic pressures to reassert something
like the prior status quo,176 or more important for symbolic or expressive
purposes than for any actual impact on the broader culture,177 or, finally, may
represent viewpoints, as to their actual holding, with whom few persons would
disagree.178
Beyond the variety of these paradoxes associated with superprecedence,
however, lie an array of unresolved crucial problems. In particular, the idea of a
superprecedent has been unfortunately tied to the simultaneously helpful but
crucially misleading metaphor of a “foundational” or “bedrock” judicial case.179
Second, there has been little progress on the practically important question of
whether superprecedence is primarily a descriptive concept, or primarily a
normative or evaluative concept, or some other interesting hybrid.180 And finally,
little attention has been paid to the important variety of ways in which a case,
including a presumed superprecedent, could be meaningfully limited or
constrained in its influence without being in any sense overruled.181

Relatedly, one might try to think of superprecedents as, most prominently, what are called
“constitutive” rules, as distinct from “regulative rules.” See JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 33–34, 50
(1969); Christopher Cherry, Regulative Rules and Constitutive Rules, 23 PHIL. Q. 301, 302 (1973).
Very roughly, constitutive rules might establish (and then regulate) an institution, whereas a regulative rule would merely govern a pre-existing practice. Rights, as well, might also be thought of
as either constitutive or regulative. See Eric J. Mitnick, Constitutive Rights, 20 OXFORD. J. LEGAL
STUD. 185, 185–86 (2000); Ernest A. Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of
Constitutions: A Research Agenda, 10 J. CONST. L. 399 (2008). It would seem, however, that many
candidates for judicial superprecedent status will be difficult to classify as either primarily
“constitutive,” in any sense, or as primarily “regulative.” And a heavily regulative, or
de-regulative, case precedent could presumably also speak to who we are, or (ought to) aspire to
be as a people.
175
See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
176
177
178
179
180
181

See supra notes 101–110 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 111–115 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117–136 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140–158 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160–165 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166–174 and accompanying text.
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Until at least some of these important problems are satisfactorily
addressed, it seems best to downplay, and thus to broadly subordinate and
downgrade, any reliance on the idea of a judicial superprecedent.
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